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First Amendment Associational Rights of Political Parties Should Be
Extended to Include Candidate Replacement
Abstract

This Comment analyzes whether the First Amendment
associational rights of the major political parties should include
candidate replacement and argues that the rights of parties to define
who votes in the primary logically should be extended to include a
right to replace candidates on the ballot after a withdrawal. Based on
the more recent Supreme Court cases finding greater freedom of
association for political parties, this Comment will focus on the 2002
replacement of Robert Torricelli in the New Jersey U.S. Senate
election and the 2006 failure to replace Tom DeLay in the Texas
22nd Congressional District U.S. House of Representatives election.
Although Torricelli and DeLay withdrew under similar
circumstances, the courts came to markedly different results, showing
the unequal impact of the different candidate replacement laws and
their effect on elections for federal office.19 This Comment
recommends a federal standard that will ensure political parties
retain their First Amendment associational rights, while still allowing
the states to efficiently manage the election process.
Part I.A of this Comment traces the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the associational rights of political parties from the restrictive White Primary Cases to the
more recent trend of greater
associational freedoms. Part I.B discusses the different state candidate replacement laws and illustrates their
disparate effect on
the ability of political parties to replace withdrawn candidates
through discussion of the Torricelli and DeLay withdrawals. Part II.A
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analyzes the associational rights of political parties in the context of
the candidate replacement process, and argues that political parties
should have broad powers to replace withdrawn candidates. Finally,
Part II.B of this Comment recommends a national standard for
candidate replacement in federal elections that is narrowly tailored
and preserves the associational freedoms of the political parties.
Keywords
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Robert Torricelli
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INTRODUCTION
In every election year, there seems to be at least one candidate for
federal office who wins his or her party’s primary election and then
1
withdraws before the general election. Candidates withdraw for
2
3
many reasons including death, family or personal reasons, political
4
5
pressure, and political scandal. After a candidate withdraws, the
1. See, e.g., Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Rep. Foley Quits in Page
Scandal, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2006, at A01 (discussing Congressman Mark Foley’s
decision to withdraw from his re-election bid weeks before the 2006 election amidst
evidence of online sexual advances toward minors); Liam Ford & Rudolph Bush,
Ryan Quits Race, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2004, at 1 (detailing the decision by Republican
candidate for Senate, Jack Ryan, to withdraw a few months prior to the 2004 election
after reports of an ongoing messy divorce surfaced); Sen. Wellstone, Seven Others Die in
Plane Crash, FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 25, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,66
707,00.html (reporting the crash of a small plane carrying Senator Paul Wellstone
and members of his family and staff just two weeks before the 2002 election).
2. See, e.g., Missouri Has New Governor After Crash Kills Carnahan, CNN.COM, Oct.
18, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/10/18/carnahan.plane.01/index.html
(noting that Senate candidate and Governor Mel Carnahan died three weeks before
the 2000 election in a plane crash).
3. See, e.g., Ford & Bush, supra note 1 (outlining the marital problems and messy
divorce that led to the withdrawal of Senate candidate Jack Ryan before the 2004
election).
4. See, e.g., id. (detailing the pressure asserted by Ryan’s Republican party,
including calls made to the chairman of the National Republican Senatorial
Committee for Ryan’s withdrawal, after the disclosure of details of Ryan’s divorce);
Sean Loughlin, Torricelli Drops Out of N.J. Race, CNN.COM, Oct. 1, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/30/elec02.nj.s.torricelli.race/ind
ex.html (quoting Senator Robert Torricelli, who trailed in the polls leading up to his
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logical question is, “What happens to his or her place on the ballot?”
Rather than one national standard, as is the case with federal
6
campaign finance laws regulating campaign contributions, each state
has its own laws governing replacement of withdrawn primary
7
winners.
In recent election cycles, many primary winners withdrew from the
8
general election, leading to disparate results. When a candidate
dies, there is a clear need to replace him or her on the ballot. When
death is not the reason for withdrawal, the strict necessity for
replacement is absent. Nevertheless, parties often urgently attempt
9
to replace a withdrawn candidate. The attempted replacements of
former U.S. Representative Tom DeLay and former U.S. Senator
Robert Torricelli provide interesting examples due to the factual
similarities of the two situations and opposite ultimate outcomes. In
2002, Torricelli faced low poll numbers and accusations of accepting
bribes when he decided to withdraw only thirty-six days before the
10
general senatorial election. Although replacement seemed outside

re-election and was under heavy scrutiny for an ethics scandal, as declaring “I will not
be responsible for the loss of the Democratic majority in the United States Senate”).
5. See, e.g., Babington & Weisman, supra note 1 (placing Congressman Mark
Foley’s alleged improper conduct toward minors in the context of Foley’s political
activities, by noting that “Foley chaired the House caucus on missing and exploited
children and was credited with writing the sexual-predator provisions of the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006”).
6. See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000) (restricting
the amount of money all candidates for federal office, regardless of geographical
location, can accept from different types of donors when campaigning).
7. See Benjamin Handler, Note, Abandoning the Cause: An Interstate Comparison of
Candidate Withdrawal and Replacement Laws, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 413, 414-15
(2004) (examining strategic withdrawals by candidates and how the different
election laws of the states are “woefully inadequate” to handle such situations).
8. Compare Coleman Wins Minnesota Senate Race, CNN.COM, Nov. 6, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/11/06/elec02.mn.s.hotrace/
(reporting Norm Coleman’s victory over former Vice President Walter Mondale, who
replaced U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone after Wellstone’s death in a plane crash only
eleven days before the general election in 2002), with Republican Senator Loses to Dead
Rival in Missouri, CNN.COM, Nov. 8, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLI
TICS/stories/11/07/senate.missouri/ (discussing that even though Missouri
Governor Mel Carnahan died in a plane crash about three weeks before the 2000
general election for the U.S. Senate, Carnahan won the election posthumously after
the Missouri law would not allow Carnahan’s name to be replaced on the ballot). As
these examples show, it may be easier for a deceased candidate to win an election
than a replacement who was not involved in the election prior to the death of the
initial candidate.
9. See, e.g., Loughlin, supra note 4 (discussing the aftermath of Senator
Torricelli’s late withdrawal and noting that “[e]ven before Torricelli’s
announcement, party officials were looking at possible alternative candidates”).
10. See id. (noting that “Torricelli’s campaign has been hurt by an ethics
controversy” and that recent polls “showed him trailing Forrester by double digits”).
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the timeframe permitted on the face of the New Jersey law, the New
Jersey Supreme Court allowed the New Jersey Democratic Party to
12
replace Torricelli’s name on the ballot. The comparably embattled
DeLay decided to withdraw from his re-election bid months before
13
the general election in 2006, but the federal courts declared the
Texas statute unconstitutional and did not allow the Republican Party
14
of Texas to replace DeLay on the ballot.
While the courts in the Torricelli and DeLay cases came to
markedly different decisions on candidate replacement, the Supreme
Court has recently moved toward finding that the two major political
parties—Republican and Democratic—have a definitive freedom of
expressive association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
15
Amendments of the Constitution. In these recent cases, in contrast
11. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-20 (West 1999) (setting out procedure for “the
event of a vacancy, howsoever caused, among candidates nominated at primaries,
which vacancy shall occur not later than the 51st day before the general election”
while remaining silent in regards to vacancies occurring the last fifty days before the
election).
12. See N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1037-39 (N.J. 2002)
(noting that the statute is silent on vacancies occurring in the last fifty days before
the general election and arguing that where there is sufficient time to make a
replacement during these last fifty days, as there was here, the replacement should
occur).
13. See Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, No. A-06-CA-459-SS, 2006 WL 1851295,
at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2006), aff’d, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006) (outlining the
Republican Party of Texas’s attempted replacement of DeLay on the ballot after
DeLay, rather than actually withdrawing from the election, attempted to declare
himself ineligible based upon his residency in Virginia). Delay likely attempted this
maneuver because the Texas withdrawal statute requires proof of a “catastrophic
illness” or death for withdrawal and replacement.
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 145.036(b) (Vernon 2006). Although DeLay’s attempt was not a withdrawal as
defined by the Texas statutes, the analysis remains the same because DeLay would
have withdrawn if the Texas statutes were not written in a way to limit his options.
Due to the statutory language, however, DeLay needed to be declared ineligible in
order for the Republican Party to be able to replace his name on the ballot. See TEX.
ELEC. CODE ANN. § 145.003 (Vernon 2006) (setting forth the limited grounds on
which a candidate may be declared ineligible).
14. See Tex. Democratic Party, 459 F.3d at 588-89 (declaring that DeLay was not
ineligible because Texas cannot apply the ineligibility statute in order to change the
eligibility requirements in the U.S. Constitution for Congressional candidates by
creating a pre-election inhabitancy requirement).
15. See Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 767 (2001) (highlighting the “robust protection” the Court has
given to the major party expressive association claims, while noting that “the
Supreme Court has accorded minor parties fewer associational rights than major
parties”); see, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369-70
(1997) (holding that Minnesota’s law against “fusion” candidates, prohibiting
candidates from appearing on the ballot for more than one party, does not violate
the First Amendment associational rights of the New Party, and effectively endorsing
the two party system). For a discussion of cases that defined the associational rights
of the major political parties, while not specifically addressing and treating somewhat
differently the rights of smaller political parties, see Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530
U.S. 567 (2000), Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214
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16

to the old White Primary Cases, the Supreme Court struck down laws
that prohibit parties from allowing non-party members to vote in the
17
party primary and laws that prohibit parties from limiting primary
18
voters to include only party members.
This Comment analyzes whether the First Amendment
associational rights of the major political parties should include
candidate replacement and argues that the rights of parties to define
who votes in the primary logically should be extended to include a
right to replace candidates on the ballot after a withdrawal. Based on
the more recent Supreme Court cases finding greater freedom of
association for political parties, this Comment will focus on the 2002
replacement of Robert Torricelli in the New Jersey U.S. Senate
election and the 2006 failure to replace Tom DeLay in the Texas
22nd Congressional District U.S. House of Representatives election.
Although Torricelli and DeLay withdrew under similar
circumstances, the courts came to markedly different results, showing
the unequal impact of the different candidate replacement laws and
19
their effect on elections for federal office.
This Comment
recommends a federal standard that will ensure political parties
retain their First Amendment associational rights, while still allowing
the states to efficiently manage the election process.
Part I.A of this Comment traces the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the associational rights of political parties from the
restrictive White Primary Cases to the more recent trend of greater
associational freedoms.
Part I.B discusses the different state
candidate replacement laws and illustrates their disparate effect on
(1989), and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986). See
generally FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy Gurmann ed. 1998) (compiling essays on the
freedom of association as an individual and civic value); Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s
Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 767 (2002) (arguing for a “new approach to
freedom of association under the Constitution” and concluding that “the
significance of associations . . . lies in their contributions to popular sovereignty,
rather than to free speech”).
16. See discussion infra Part I.A.1 (providing background information on some of
the many cases surrounding the Texas Democratic Party’s continual attempts to
conduct white only primary elections in the early to mid twentieth century).
17. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225 (concluding that the State could not require the
Republican Party to hold a primary closed to unaffiliated independent voters when
the Republican Party wanted to have those independent voters in their primary
election).
18. See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 574, 589 (arguing that “a corollary of the
right to associate is the right not to associate” and therefore the State cannot “forc[e]
political parties to associate with those who do not share their beliefs”).
19. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the laws and inconsistent results that
allowed Torricelli to be replaced on the ballot when he withdrew only a few weeks
before the election, while DeLay was not replaced even though he withdrew many
months before the election for remarkably similar reasons).
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the ability of political parties to replace withdrawn candidates
through discussion of the Torricelli and DeLay withdrawals. Part II.A
analyzes the associational rights of political parties in the context of
the candidate replacement process, and argues that political parties
should have broad powers to replace withdrawn candidates. Finally,
Part II.B of this Comment recommends a national standard for
candidate replacement in federal elections that is narrowly tailored
and preserves the associational freedoms of the political parties.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. History of Political Parties’ Associational Rights
Political parties in the United States have evolved over time and
20
adjusted to the changing political world. The U.S. Constitution did
not contain any mention of political parties, but as soon as elections
were held, people began identifying with political parties and
21
working within a party system to elect public officials.
Political
parties play such a large role in U.S. elections today that some
commentators argue the electoral system would collapse without the
22
two major political parties.
Despite the significance of political
parties today, they did not obtain any significant legal recognition
until 1842, and an influx of laws addressing political parties followed
23
almost immediately.
20. See generally JOHN W. EPPERSON, THE CHANGING LEGAL STATUS OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (Harold Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., 1986)
(presenting a thorough discussion of political party history and arguing that political
parties were converted from private to public between 1787 and 1985).
21. See, e.g., Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1952) (“[P]olitical parties in the
modern sense were not born with the Republic. They were created by necessity, by
the need to organize the rapidly increasing population, scattered over our Land, so
as to coordinate efforts to secure needed legislation and oppose that deemed
undesirable.”); see also Ronald L. Nelson, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Institutional
Role of Political Parties in the Political Process: What Tradition?, 15 WIDENER L.J. 85, 88-92
(2005) (detailing the history of political parties from their omission from the
Constitution to their formation “based on political necessity rather than
constitutional imperative”).
22. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? 277-96 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1995)
(analyzing why political parties were established in the United States and how they
have changed over time to become an essential part of the American political
system). But see MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
1952-1994 168-98 (1996) (arguing that political parties are losing significance and
that the 1992 presidential campaign of Independent Ross Perot illustrates how
people have become interested in independent candidates).
23. See EPPERSON, supra note 20, at 49 (explaining that even after the first legal
recognition of political parties in 1842, there was virtually no legal recognition of
political parties by the end of the Civil War). Epperson discusses the many laws that
followed the initial recognition of political parties, starting with California’s passage
of the first law in the United States that intended to regulate the nomination process
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These laws affecting political parties led to Supreme Court
24
intervention in 1921 in Newberry v. United States. In Newberry, the
Court examined a federal law regulating the amount of money that a
candidate could spend in order to gain the nomination of a political
25
party. A divided Supreme Court concluded that primaries “are in
no sense elections for an office, but merely methods by which party
26
adherents agree upon candidates.” Effectively, the Court read the
word “election” out of the phrase “primary election” and determined
27
that legislatures only had the power to regulate general elections.
The rationale in Newberry came under scrutiny in the White Primary
Cases, when the Court addressed the efforts of southern political
parties to exclude African-Americans from participating in primary
28
elections.
1. Political parties and the White Primary Cases: excluding voters based on
race
The philosophy expounded in Newberry did not stand for long, as
the Court subsequently adjusted its decision to allow regulation of
primary elections in order to address racial discrimination by political
29
parties in the South. Six years after Newberry, the Court declared in
of political parties. Id. at 50. This law was in response to the widespread corruption
within political parties at the time and paved the way for states to pass similar laws.
Id. at 50-52. By 1900, at least thirty-five states had passed legislation regulating
political party primaries and conventions, all of which had the general goal of
removing candidate nominations from the hands of party bosses. Id. at 51-53. By
passing laws to regulate political primaries, the state legislatures attempted to label
the political parties as public entities, and Epperson breaks these initial laws down
into four categories that spanned the gamut from laws addressing general anticorruption goals to statutes establishing direct primaries. Id. at 52-61. The courts
generally upheld these laws, but they were largely ineffective at changing the political
party structure, as the parties were able to adapt and continue to control their
organization until the Supreme Court intervened in the White Primary Cases. Id. at 61,
131-51.
24. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
25. See id. at 244-45 (explaining that the statute “in effect declares a candidate for
the United States Senate punishable by fine and imprisonment, if (except for certain
specified purposes) [the candidate were to] give, contribute, expend, use, promise
or cause to be given, contributed, expended, used or promised in procuring his
nomination and election more than $ 3,750”).
26. Id. at 250.
27. See id. (declaring that primary elections and general elections are “radically
different” and therefore the term “elections” in the Constitution does not include
primary elections).
28. See generally DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS (2003) (analyzing and discussing the history of the White
Primary Cases from their beginning with the Texas Democratic primary, through
similar instances of segregated primary elections in other southern states, to the fall
of the white primary).
29. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 57-60 (2001)
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30

Nixon v. Herndon that a Texas state law prohibiting AfricanAmericans from voting in the Democratic Primary denied those
31
voters equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. After
Herndon, the Texas Legislature enacted a law giving political parties
32
the power to decide who could vote in their primaries. The Texas
Democratic Party took that power and created a rule that African33
Americans could not participate in the primary.
The Supreme
Court held that this rule also violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
thus indicating that political parties must follow the Constitution as
34
though the parties were public actors.
Although the Supreme Court went back and forth on this point in
subsequent cases, the Court eventually settled on the conclusions that
35
Congress had the power to regulate primary elections and that the
Fifteenth Amendment protected voters against racial discrimination
36
by political parties in primary elections. The Court continued to
recognize this protection of African-American voting rights in Terry v.
(outlining the early White Primary Cases and citing the Supreme Court’s holdings that
primary elections could be regulated when there was discriminatory state action).
But see id. at 60 (noting that the cases actually “had little, if any, direct impact on
black voting in the South” until the Court decided Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944)).
30. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
31. See id. at 541 (declaring that the Texas statute discriminated against voters by
the sole distinction of color and that “color cannot be made the basis of a statutory
classification affecting the right set up in this case”).
32. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81-82 (1932); see Klarman, supra note 29, at 58
(noting that the new law attempted to remove the party discrimination from state
action by giving the parties the power to decide who could vote in the primary,
rather than barring by state statute the ability of blacks to vote in the primary, as in
Herndon).
33. See Condon, 286 U.S. at 82 (discussing the Texas Democratic Party’s new
resolution “that all white democrats who are qualified under the constitution and
laws of Texas . . . and none other, be allowed to participate in the primary
elections”).
34. See id. at 88-89 (holding that leaders of the political parties who excluded
African-Americans from voting in the primary election were delegates of the State’s
power and therefore could not discriminate against African-Americans, as the leaders
were constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment).
35. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (“[A] primary election
which involves a necessary step in the choice of candidates for election as
representatives in Congress, and which in the circumstances of this case controls that
choice, is an election within the meaning of the constitutional provision and is
subject to congressional regulation as to the manner of holding it.”).
36. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944) (“Here we are applying,
contrary to the recent decision in Grovey v. Townsend, the well established principle of
the Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding the abridgement by a state of a citizen’s right
to vote.”). The Grovey Court classified the party definition of who may vote in a
primary election as non-state action and therefore concluded that there were no
convincing grounds for declaring a constitutional infraction. Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45, 55 (1935). The Smith Court overruled the Grovey holding that the Texas
Democratic Party was a private and voluntary association, not a delegate of state
power. Smith, 321 U.S. at 664-66.
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37

Adams, when it condemned discrimination that was seemingly far
38
The events in question were not
removed from state action.
discrimination by a political party, but rather discrimination by a
group composed of members of the Texas Democratic Party called
39
the Jaybird Association. Thus the Court had to decide whether this
40
group must follow the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The
Jaybird Association held significant power in Texas by conducting a
straw poll before the primary election that essentially decided the
41
primary winner and eventual general election winner. The Court
held that the Jaybird Association’s exclusion of blacks from their
42
straw poll violated the Fifteenth Amendment. This decision helped
43
put an end to the white primary, and in doing so minimized the
apparent freedom of association claims of political parties and their
closely affiliated groups by seemingly classifying political parties as
44
public actors and not private associations.

37. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
38. See id. at 462-64 (defining the question to be decided as whether the Fifteenth
Amendment protections of the Constitution extend to impact the actions of an
organization that is not a state actor or a political party, but still acts in a way to
deliberately exclude African-Americans from voting).
39. See id. at 463 (explaining that the Jaybird Association was “run like other
political parties” and noting that white people “are automatically members if their
names appear on the official list of county voters” and “that Jaybird activities
follow[ed] a plan purposefully designed to exclude Negroes from voting”).
40. Id. at 472-73 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 482-83 (Clark, J., concurring) (arguing that the Jaybird straw poll
and the Democratic primary are linked together by the regularity of the Jaybird vote
and its consistency in picking the ultimate winner); see also id. at 483 (describing the
power of the Jaybird Association, noting that “[a]fter gaining the Jaybird Democratic
Association’s endorsement, the announced winners after full publicity then file in
the July Democratic primary” and that “[t]he record reveals that 3,910 eligible voters
were listed in Fort Bend County in the presidential year 1944; though only 2,032
participated in the July primary under the Democratic banner, 3,790 members voted
in the May balloting of the Jaybird Democratic Association”); id. at 472 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (noting that candidates not endorsed by the Jaybird Association
“almost never file in the Democratic primary”).
42. See id. at 476-77 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (clarifying that the Jaybird
Association’s role in the scheme to undermine the operation and regulation of the
official primary brings it within reach of the Fifteenth Amendment); see also id. at
483-84 (Clark, J., concurring) (noting that “the Jaybird Democratic Association
operates as an auxiliary of the local Democratic party” and since the winner of the
straw poll has little or no opposition afterwards “the Negro minority’s vote is
nullified”).
43. See HINE, supra note 28, at 248 (recognizing the decision in Terry as
“represent[ing] the last gasp of the Democratic white primary”).
44. See Terry, 345 U.S. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring) (concluding that “the Jaybird
Democratic Association fall[s] within the broad principle laid down in Smith v.
Allwright” and therefore defines state action broadly to include political parties and
other organizations that have influence in elections).
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2. Political parties’ right to exclude and include voters based on party
registration
Many years after the White Primary Cases, Supreme Court opinions
discussing the status of political parties’ associational rights moved
away from issues of race to the more general issue of party control
45
over the primary process. In these cases, the Supreme Court shifted
its characterization of political parties back toward private
46
associations with greater freedom to make internal decisions.
In one of the first cases finding greater associational rights for
political parties, the Court declared in 1981 that parties have the
constitutional right to make rules determining how convention voters
47
are chosen, and who can vote at a party convention. After holding
that political parties have an associational right to make purely
internal decisions regarding conventions, the Court addressed party
control over who may vote in primary elections. The Supreme Court,
48
in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, definitively held that
political parties have constitutionally protected freedom of
49
association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Tashjian
involved a challenge by the Republican Party of Connecticut to a
Connecticut law that prohibited parties from allowing non-members

45. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political
Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 278-80
(2001) (arguing that the more recent cases regarding political party associational
rights have incorrectly attempted to give political parties a right of expressive
association that trumps demands by voters for an unrestrained right to participate).
46. Cf. Persily, supra note 15, at 754-63 (detailing two ways to view the White
Primary Cases in light of the question of political parties’ associational rights, namely
to dismiss them as unique or consider them definitive).
47. See Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 126
(1981) (holding that the associational right of the National Democratic Party could
be balanced with the substantial interest of the State of Wisconsin in regulating its
elections by allowing Wisconsin to hold an open primary, but not requiring the
Wisconsin delegates to the National Party to vote at the National Convention in
accordance with the Wisconsin primary results, if to do so would violate the National
Party rules). This was a dispute about the Wisconsin primary process, where the
Wisconsin Democrats held an open primary in which every registered voter could
vote, and the delegate from Wisconsin was required, under Wisconsin law, to vote at
the National Convention in accordance with the results of the Wisconsin primary.
However, the State’s mandate that the Wisconsin delegates be required to allocate
their votes according to the results of the primary violated National Party rules. Id. at
109-12. The Court held that the associational rights of both the State party to be free
to choose how their primary elections are conducted and the national party to
control the process by which delegates are selected to its National Convention could
survive. Id. at 126.
48. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
49. Id. at 214 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (plurality opinion);
see also id. at 214 (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)) (noting that
“[t]he right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of
this basic constitutional freedom”).
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50

to vote in their primary. The Court held that the Connecticut law
limited the Republican Party’s freedom of association by prohibiting
the Party from allowing independent voters to partake in the
51
Republican Party primary. The Court then rejected Connecticut’s
52
claimed interests and held that a statute requiring a closed primary
is unconstitutional when it stops a political party from opening their
53
candidate selection process to independent voters.
In addition to having the right to allow independent voters to vote
in a party primary, the Court held in California Democratic Party v.
54
Jones that political parties’ associational rights include the right to
55
The case
exclude non-members from voting in the primary.
addressed a California law passed by ballot initiative that required a
56
blanket primary to determine party nominations. A blanket primary
allows primary voters to vote in any political party primary for each
political office. For example, a registered Republican may vote in the
Republican primary for governor, the Democratic primary for
57
Senator, and the Libertarian primary for House of Representatives.
After the ballot initiative passed, the Democratic, Republican,
Libertarian, and Peace and Freedom Parties joined together in
58
challenging the California law.
50. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210-12 (explaining that the Connecticut statute
requires voters to be members of the party in order to vote in that party’s primary,
while the Republican Party of Connecticut’s rule allowed both registered
Republicans and voters not enrolled in any party to vote in the Republican Party
primary).
51. See id. at 215-16 (arguing that by limiting the people who the party may invite,
“[t]he State thus limits the Party’s associational opportunities at the crucial juncture”
of candidate selection).
52. See id. at 217-25 (rejecting Connecticut’s claims that the statute served the
compelling interests of “ensuring the administrability of the primary system,
preventing raiding, avoiding voter confusion, and protecting the responsibility of
party government”).
53. See id. at 225 (concluding that the statute is a burden on the First
Amendment rights of the Republican Party, that the state interests presented are
insubstantial, and therefore that the statute is unconstitutional as applied).
54. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
55. See id. at 575 (declaring that a political association’s “right to exclude” is most
important during a primary election or other means of selecting the party nominee).
56. See id. at 570-71 (noting that the law came into effect from the passage of
Proposition 198, which passed by a statewide vote of the members of all parties).
57. See id. at 570 (explaining California’s blanket primary in comparison to an
open or closed primary). There is no set primary that a voter is required to vote in
when nominating any candidate for any office under California’s blanket primary
system. Id. The voter essentially may choose his or her favorite candidate from all
the candidates in every party for each individual office. See id. (“Under the new
system, ‘all persons entitled to vote, including those not affiliated with any political
party, shall have the right to vote . . . for any candidate regardless of the candidate’s
political affiliation.’” (quoting CAL. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 2001 (West Supp. 2000))).
58. See id. at 571 (noting that each party involved has a party rule prohibiting
non-members from voting in the party primary). The challenge is also interesting
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In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia addressed whether political
parties are public or private by noting, “we [the Court] have not
held . . . that the processes by which political parties select their
nominees are . . . wholly public affairs that States may regulate
59
freely.” Justice Scalia took the opportunity to clarify the rulings in
the White Primary Cases, explicitly stating that “[t]hey do not stand for
the proposition that party affairs are public affairs, free of First
60
Amendment protections . . . .”
The Court went on to state
emphatically that “[t]here is simply no substitute for a party’s
61
selecting its own candidates.”
Since the Court found that the California law placed a severe
burden on the associational rights of the political parties, the State
needed to show that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest in order for the blanket primary law to
62
stand. The Court, however, rejected as uncompelling all seven state
63
interests offered by California. Moreover, the Court concluded that
the blanket primary law was not narrowly tailored to serve any of the
64
interests presented, even if those interests were compelling. Thus,
the Court held the California blanket primary requirement
unconstitutional and gave political parties the right to choose to
65
exclude non-members from the candidate selection process.
because Proposition 198 passed by a majority vote in California, yet all the
recognized political parties in the state challenged the law and thus the desires of
their members. Id. at 570-71.
59. Id. at 572-73.
60. Id. at 573 (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208
(1986)).
61. Id. at 581.
62. Id. at 582.
63. Id. at 582-86. The seven interests offered by California were (1) “producing
elected officials who better represent the electorate,” (2) “expanding candidate
debate beyond the scope of partisan concerns,” (3) “ensur[ing] that disenfranchised
persons enjoy the right to an effective vote,” (4) “promoting fairness,” (5) “affording
voters greater choice,” (6) “increasing voter participation,” and (7) “protecting
privacy.” Id. at 582-84.
64. See id. at 582-86 (eliminating the State’s third compelling interest and then
stating that “[r]espondents’ remaining four asserted state interests—promoting
fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing voter participation, and
protecting privacy—are not, like the others, automatically out of the running; but
neither are they, in the circumstances of this case, compelling”).
65. See id. at 585-86 (holding that political parties’ First Amendment freedom of
association to exclude non-members from their primary election is severely and
unnecessarily burdened by Proposition 198 and declaring that a non-partisan blanket
primary that did not include any party affiliations on the ballot would protect all the
state interests that California put forth in defense of Proposition 198); Richard H.
Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 104 (2004)
(arguing that the Court’s decision was “potentially as sweeping as many landmark
Warren Court decisions” because it “might mean that parties are entitled to opt for
whatever primary-election structure they prefer”); John R. Labbe, Comment,
Louisiana’s Blanket Primary After California Democratic Party v. Jones, 96 NW. U. L.
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Subsequently, the Court allowed Oklahoma to set a boundary on
political parties’ right to declare who can vote in their primaries in
66
Clingman v. Beaver. In Clingman, the Court upheld an Oklahoma law
that prohibited parties from allowing members of other parties to
67
vote in their primary. The Court decided that refusing to allow
registered members of one party to vote in a primary of another party
68
was not a large infringement on the party’s freedom of association.
The Court noted that Oklahoma allowed independent voters to vote
in any primary they wanted but required affiliated voters to vote in
69
their party’s primary. The Court rested its decision on the fact that
a voter could change his or her registration or simply become
unaffiliated with all political parties and choose any primary to vote
70
in. According to the Court, “a voter who is unwilling to disaffiliate
from [one] party to vote in [another party’s] primary forms little
71
‘association’ with the [second party and vice versa].”
72
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, the
Supreme Court looked at political parties’ associational rights outside
73
The Court
the context of defining the eligible primary voters.
examined whether a California law banning primary endorsements
REV. 721, 742-53 (2002) (concluding that the only options remaining for each state
are either to require a closed primary or to allow the primary to shift back to party
control completely, possibly ending direct primaries altogether).
66. 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
67. See id. at 598 (concluding that whether members of one political party should
be allowed to vote in another party’s primary election is a decision for each
individual state and not within the U.S. Constitution’s control).
68. See id. at 587 (“We are persuaded that any burden Oklahoma’s semiclosed
primary imposes is minor and justified by legitimate state interests.”).
69. See id. at 584-85 (noting that the Oklahoma laws in question allow the party
itself to decide whether or not to allow independent voters to vote in the primary).
70. See id. at 587-88 (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,
235 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (concluding therein that a party has the freedom
to associate with whomever they choose to select as their nominees as long as the
individual is not already formally associated with another party and refuses to change
that association); Lowell J. Schiller, Recent Development, Imposing Necessary
Boundaries on Judicial Discretion in Ballot Access Cases, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 331,
343 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s rejection of “dual associations” was not
inconsistent with California Democratic Party v. Jones, even though Clingman “limited
the possibility of the Court taking a more proactive stance in rewriting primary laws
across the nation”). But see M. Jason Scoggins, Recent Development, Placing
Unnecessary Limits on Voting and Associational Freedoms, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 345,
356 (2005) (concluding that the Court should re-examine the semi-closed primaries
similar to Oklahoma’s and that parties should have the associational right to “police
member loyalty” in order to increase “transparen[cy] and improve accountability”).
71. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 589 (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208, 235 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
72. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
73. See id. at 223 (reading precedent broadly in noting that the statute
prohibiting parties from making primary endorsements “directly hampers the ability
of a party to spread its message and hamstrings voters seeking to inform themselves
about the candidates and the campaign issues”).
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74

by political parties was unconstitutional. As in Clingman, the Court
found the state’s suggested interests uncompelling. Further, the
Court held that even if the interests had been compelling, the state
had not narrowly tailored the law to serve any of the suggested
75
interests. In striking down the California law, the Court emphasized
that a political party’s freedom of association, among other things,
includes the freedom “to select a ‘standard bearer who best
76
represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.’”
Together, these cases support the idea that political parties have
limited associational rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to define the group of people who vote to choose the
parties’ general election candidates. However, because the Supreme
Court never overruled the White Primary Cases, some limits on the
77
associational rights of political parties remain.
Unquestionably,
political parties cannot discriminate on the basis of race in deciding
78
who can participate in the selection of general election candidates.
Furthermore, political parties do not have the right to allow voters
affiliated with other parties to vote in their primary when state laws
79
say otherwise. Outside of these limitations, political parties appear
to have the right to decide who chooses their general election
candidates.
B. Political Parties’ Efforts to Replace a Withdrawn Primary Winner
This Comment addresses a political party’s rights when political
candidates in a federal election win their party’s primary election but,
for one reason or another, decide to withdraw before the general
election. The law of each state regulates how to proceed in this
74. See id. at 216-17 (explaining that the law makes it a misdemeanor for a
primary candidate to claim to be the party’s “officially endorsed candidate,” and that
this has made it “possible for a candidate with views antithetical to those of her party
nevertheless to win its primary”).
75. See id. at 232-33 (rejecting the claim of a compelling interest to manage the
internal affairs of political parties democratically because the State did not show that
the regulation was necessary to ensure fair and orderly elections).
76. Id. at 224 (quoting Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567,
601 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm, J., concurring in result)).
77. See Persily, supra note 15, at 758-59 (stating that the White Primary Cases are
viewed in different ways and that the recent cases involving primary elections and
political parties fail to set forth an “honest appraisal that incorporates [the White
Primary Cases] into the larger doctrine of case law on state action”).
78. See discussion supra Part I.A.1 (providing background information on the
White Primary Cases and detailing the end result which prohibited political parties
from excluding people from the party primary based on their race).
79. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 589 (2005) (noting that little
association exists between a voter and a party when the voter is registered to a
different party and thus upholding a state law that required a voter to vote in the
primary for the party to which the voter is registered).
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80

situation. These laws may lead to markedly different results under
81
very similar circumstances. Some state laws allow for withdrawal
82
under any circumstance, while others only allow withdrawal in
83
particular situations. Many states have candidate replacement laws
that set a timeline for when a replacement is acceptable and when it
84
However, while most states with such timelines require
is not.
withdrawals and replacements to occur by a set number of days
before the general election, no standard number of days exists
85
among the states.
Compounding the problem of having many different candidate
replacement laws is the differing interpretations of these laws by the
courts. Whether courts read candidate replacement laws strictly or
liberally largely determines whether or not a candidate may be
86
replaced. Strict interpretation often leads to a party’s inability to
replace a withdrawn candidate, as the judge refuses to allow
candidate replacement unless the situation at hand fits the statute
87
perfectly. On the other hand, a liberal reading of the statute will
likely lead to the replacement of a withdrawn candidate because a
80. Handler, supra note 7, at 414-15.
81. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the remarkably similar political
situations and reasons for withdrawal between Tom DeLay and Robert Torricelli and
focusing on the fact that Torricelli was replaced and DeLay was not, even though
DeLay withdrew from the election much earlier than Torricelli).
82. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-13-23 (2007) (allowing replacement of a candidate
without restrictions as to the reason for, or timing of, the withdrawal).
83. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8803 (West 2006) (allowing replacement of a
candidate only if the original candidate dies and the proper election officials are
notified “at least 68 days before the date of the next ensuing general election”).
84. See generally Handler, supra note 7, at 419 (noting that Minnesota allows
candidate replacement to occur if withdrawal is made more than fourteen days
before an election, while Colorado allows a candidate substitution if the original
candidate withdraws at least eighteen days before the general election).
85. Compare W. VA. CODE § 3-5-19 (2007) (allowing replacement of candidates
who die “no later than twenty-five days before the general election,” replacement of
candidates with “extenuating personal circumstances” ninety-eight days prior to
general election, and replacement of incapacitated candidates “if the vacancy occurs
not later than eighty-four days before the general election”), with ALASKA STAT. §
15.25.110 (2006) (“If a candidate of a political party nominated at the primary
election dies, withdraws, resigns, becomes disqualified from holding the office for
which the candidate is nominated, or is certified as being incapacitated in the
manner prescribed by this section after the primary election and 48 days or more
before the general election, the vacancy may be filled by party petition.”).
86. Cf. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64
ALB. L. REV. 9, 87 (2000) (analyzing methods courts use for statutory construction
and concluding that “courts persist in ruling that . . . they will strictly or liberally
construe statutes in a way that favors certain purposes, results or parties”).
87. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, No. A-06-CA-459-SS, 2006 WL
1851295, at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2006), aff’d, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006) (“In
deciding election disputes, ‘[a]ny constitutional or statutory provision which restricts
the right to hold office must be strictly construed against ineligibility.’” (quoting
Wenthworth v. Meyer, 839 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1992))).
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judge is more likely to find that the statute covers a given situation in
88
an effort to ensure greater voter choice.
The Tom DeLay and Robert Torricelli cases demonstrate the
absurdity of the inconsistent interpretation of candidate replacement
89
laws for federal office.
Both DeLay and Torricelli withdrew for
largely political reasons. DeLay, however, was not replaced on the
ballot despite withdrawing many months prior to the election, while
Torricelli was replaced when he withdrew only a few weeks before the
election. As detailed below, the federal district and circuit courts
read the Texas statute strictly in deciding not to allow a replacement
on the ballot for Tom DeLay. On the other hand, the New Jersey
Supreme Court read the New Jersey statute liberally in finding that
the Democratic Party could replace Robert Torricelli on the ballot.
1.

Attempted replacement of Tom DeLay in Texas
In September 2005, U.S. House of Representatives Republican
Majority Leader Tom DeLay stepped down from his leadership
90
position following an indictment on a criminal conspiracy charge.
91
The embattled DeLay vehemently denied the charges as baseless,
92
remained a Member of Congress, and vowed to run for re-election.

88. See, e.g., N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1033 (N.J.
2002) (“Election laws are to be liberally construed so as to effectuate their purpose.
They should not be construed so as to deprive voters of their franchise or so as to
render an election void for technical reasons.” (quoting Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 91 A.2d
865, 865 (1952))).
89. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2 (representing the uncertain affect of
withdrawal and replacement).
90. See R. Jeffrey Smith, DeLay Indicted in Texas Finance Probe, WASH. POST, Sept.
29, 2005, at A01 (reporting the indictment of DeLay “on a charge of criminally
conspiring with two political associates to inject illegal corporate contributions into
2002 state elections that helped the Republican Party reorder the congressional map
in Texas and cement its control of the House in Washington”).
91. See Nicholas Thompson, The Tom DeLay Scandals: A Scorecard, SLATE, Apr. 7,
2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2116392/ (detailing five Tom DeLay “scandals” well
before his indictment). DeLay had a reputation for getting what he wanted in
Congress and he was a master at maneuvering, which made him a highly watched
figure and a very polarizing person. See Peter Perl, ‘Absolute Truth’, WASH. POST, May
13, 2001 (Magazine), at W12 (stating that DeLay is known in Washington by such
nicknames as “the Hammer,” “the Exterminator” and “the Meanest Man in
Congress”). One of the most ironic aspects of DeLay’s rise to power was that he was
elected on the backs of the conservative religious community who care deeply about
morals. DeLay’s alleged illegal actions, however, appear to show him as an immoral
man. Cf. John W. Dean, David Kuo’s Book “Tempting Faith”: The Author’s Agenda, the
Authoritarian Behavior He Reports, And the White House’s Response, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Oct.
20, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20061020.html (detailing the
“remarkable, actually weird but understandable, connection between being corrupt
and being elected by the Religious Right”).
92. See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Primary for DeLay’s Seat is Shaping Up as Referendum
on the Incumbent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, at A14 (discussing DeLay’s primary
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In March 2006, Tom DeLay faced a Republican Party primary against
three challengers and collected sixty-two percent of the vote despite
93
his indictment.
DeLay’s election victory quickly turned sour when polls showed
him trailing his Democratic opponent, former U.S. Representative
94
Nick Lampson. Lampson gained momentum throughout the race
as the “anti-corruption candidate” by focusing almost exclusively on
95
DeLay’s alleged criminal problems and ethics violations.
Meanwhile, DeLay faced further ethical questions after his former
96
chief of staff pled guilty to conspiracy and corruption charges. As
DeLay’s poll numbers continued to suffer and his criminal
investigation was constantly in the news, DeLay decided to resign
from the House of Representatives and quit campaigning for re97
election.
DeLay stopped his bid for re-election seven months before the
general election but after his victory in the Republican primary
98
election. The relevant Texas statute stated that a candidate could be
declared ineligible as long as the declaration occurred thirty days
before the election and “the information on the candidate’s
application for a place on the ballot indicates that the candidate is
election race against little-known challengers and his optimism about victory in the
general election).
93. Sylvia Moreno, DeLay Wins Tex. GOP Primary, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2006, at
A04.
94. Id.
95. A search on Google.com on Jan. 10, 2007 restricted to the Nick Lampson
campaign website (http://www.lampson.com/) for “Nick Lampson DeLay
corruption” (quotations omitted) returned 30 hits. The pages found included
language such as “Our campaign to bring an end to Tom DeLay’s era of corruption
and cronyism had our best fundraising quarter yet. . . ,” http://www.lampson.com/m
essages?id=0009, and “Tom DeLay is the poster boy for corruption in Washington,”
http://www.lampson.com/news?id=0048, among others. See also Josephine Hearn,
Dems Decry ‘Culture of Corruption’, THE HILL, Sept. 29, 2005, at 1 (discussing Lampson
and other Democrats’ strategy to portray the Republican Party as corrupt in order to
win elections in November 2006).
96. See Juliet Eilperin & Jeffrey H. Bimbaum, A Force Behind the Power, WASH. POST,
Apr. 1, 2006, at A09 (discussing former DeLay aide Tony C. Rudy’s guilty plea to
charges of conspiracy to corrupt public officials with lobbyist Jack Abramoff, who was
already in prison after pleading guilty to multiple charges).
97. See Jonathan Weisman & Chris Cillizzi, DeLay to Resign from Congress, WASH.
POST, Apr. 4, 2006, at A01 (“Former aides and sources close to DeLay said his
decision was motivated not by [former aide] Rudy’s guilty plea but by DeLay’s
concerns that he might lose his suburban Houston seat to his Democratic opponent,
former representative Nick Lampson, and his belief that another Republican could
win instead.”).
98. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Jonathan Weisman, DeLay Departing on Own Terms,
WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006, at A01 (“DeLay was determined to hang on to his seat at
least through the primary . . . because he considered his three Republican
challengers gadflies and traitors and he was determined to try to block them from
succeeding him.”).
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ineligible for the office.” The Republican Party of Texas argued
that DeLay was ineligible to run for Congress in Texas because he was
100
The
a resident of Virginia and registered to vote in Virginia.
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas,
however, emphasized that the Constitution required a candidate to
be an “inhabitant” of the state in which he is running for Congress
101
only “when elected.”
Since this statute addressed eligibility of
candidates, the district court declared that Texas could not change
102
the constitutional eligibility requirements for federal candidates.
By strictly construing the statute in relation to the Constitution, the
district court held that DeLay’s residency before the election was
irrelevant, as long as he could be an inhabitant of Texas “when
103
elected.” The court further stated that it would not speculate as to
104
The United States Court of
DeLay’s inhabitance on Election Day.
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court,
recognizing that DeLay would only have to move back to Texas on
the day of the election in order to meet the Constitution’s eligibility
105
requirements.
In making their decisions, the district and circuit
courts likely took note of reports that DeLay won the primary with
the full intention of dropping out before the general election, as well
as arguments that a new candidate could unfairly affect the
106
Democratic challenger.
The district and circuit courts would not
99. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 145.003 (Vernon 2006); see also discussion supra note
13 (explaining why the Republican Party of Texas attempted to declare DeLay
ineligible rather than simply having DeLay withdraw from the election altogether
and then attempt to replace him).
100. See Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, No. A-06-CA-459-SS, 2006 WL 1851295,
at *5-*7 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2006), aff’d, (noting that Benkiser submitted
documentation of DeLay’s voter registration and drivers license in Virginia to the
court).
101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the age of twenty five years, and been seven years a citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in
which he shall be chosen.”); Tex. Democratic Party, 2006 WL 1851295, at *7 (stating
that “historical materials also support a literal reading of ‘when elected’ to mean on
election day itself” and not at any point prior to the election).
102. Tex. Democratic Party, 2006 WL 1851295, at *6.
103. Id. at *5.
104. See id. at *6 (“The Court finds that the Constitution does not permit such
speculative determinations where the election of a United States Representatives is at
issue, specifically because Benkiser’s prediction of future eligibility based on current
inhabitancy would amount to an imposition of an unconstitutional pre-election
residency requirement.”).
105. See Tex. Democratic Party, 459 F.3d at 589-90 (declaring that Benkiser could not
know whether DeLay would be ineligible from his inhabitancy on June 7, 2006 when
the election wasn’t until November 2006).
106. See Tex. Democratic Party, 2006 WL 1851295, at *2 (explaining that the Texas
Democratic Party and its candidate Nick Lampson claimed standing in part because
they will be injured by an “unfair advantage” gained by the Republican Party of Texas
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allow DeLay’s name to be replaced on the ballot. As a result, the
Republican Party of Texas later dropped Delay from the ballot
without a replacement, instead putting the Republican Party’s weight
107
behind a write-in candidate in hopes of defeating Lampson.
2.

Attempted replacement of Robert Torricelli in New Jersey
In 2002, Democratic Senator Robert Torricelli was seemingly on
108
his way to re-election. The former counsel to Vice President Walter
Mondale, six-term Member of the U.S. House of Representatives, and
sitting Senator won the Democratic primary with 100% of the vote in
109
an unopposed race. Meanwhile, Torricelli’s Republican opponent,
Doug Forrester, was generally unknown, had very little political
110
However, the Senate
experience, and was trailing in the polls.
if DeLay was replaced on the ballot); Smith & Weisman, supra note 98 (detailing
DeLay’s desire to win the primary before withdrawing from the election); Handler,
supra note 7, at 413 (suggesting that two goals of candidate replacement laws should
be “to distinguish legitimate political decisions from corrupt practices” and “reduce
the influence of political bosses,” thus statutes and the courts interpreting them
should try to ensure the primary voters choose political candidates as often as
possible, rather than allowing committees to hand-pick candidates on a regular basis
after the primary).
107. See, e.g., Hilary Hylton, Campaign ‘06: Tom DeLay’s Gift to the Democrats,
TIME.COM, Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,154973
9,00.html (citing experts who say that DeLay’s district, which President Bush won in
2004 carrying 64% of the vote, would likely go to the Democrats since the court
decisions and DeLay’s actions left the race without a Republican candidate).
Remarkably, the write-in candidate, Shelley Sekula-Gibbs, received roughly 42% of
the total votes and nearly held DeLay’s seat for the Republican Party. TEXAS SEC’Y OF
STATE, 2006 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS, STATEWIDE RACE SUMMARY,
http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select “2006 General Election” in dropdown menu, select “Statewide Race Summary,” and click submit) (showing further
that the Democrat Nick Lampson won by under 15,000 votes in the strongly
Republican 22nd Congressional District).
108. Cf. New Jersey Senate Election Results, CNN.COM, Nov. 6, 1996, http://www.cnn.c
om/ELECTION/NJ00senate.html (showing Torricelli winning his last campaign
with a 53% to 43% margin). Although incumbents are not guaranteed to win, they
have a distinct advantage in our system and Torricelli only became vulnerable when
ethics violations arose. See generally Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr.,
The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 19422000, 1 ELECTION L.J. 315 (2002) (surveying the elections from 1942 to 2000 and
analyzing the continually increasing advantage that incumbents enjoy when running
for re-election).
109. DIV. OF ELECTIONS, N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, 2002 PRIMARY ELECTION
RESULTS 1, 5 (2002), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/elections/2002results/02primaryele
ction/2002p_us_state_sum_candidate_tally.pdf. Official results also show that the
Republican primary was a three person competitive race that Douglas Forrester won
by just under 17,000 votes. Id. at 2-5.
110. See Samara Aberman, Doug Forrester Biography, ONLINE NEWSHOUR,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/vote2002/races/nj_forrester.html (last visited May
31, 2007) (noting that Forrester’s only experience in an elected office was a “two-year
stint as mayor of West Windsor, New Jersey”); Press Release, Quinnipiac University
Polling Institute, GOP Challenger in Striking Distance of Torricelli, Quinnipiac
University Poll Finds; Senate Race Pits Unknown Vs. Unliked (June 19, 2002),
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Ethics Committee’s summer investigation led to the news that
111
Torricelli improperly accepted gifts from a campaign contributor.
The polls quickly reversed, and Forrester soon had a four percentage
112
point lead over Torricelli.
As re-election looked doubtful, and
likely amidst pressure from his party, Torricelli withdrew from the
113
general election on September 30, 2002.
Torricelli’s withdrawal came thirty-six days before the general
114
election.
New Jersey’s statutory language indicated that a
withdrawal must be made at least fifty-one days before the general
115
election. The statute stated that there need not be a specific reason
for a withdrawal, and it allowed replacement of the candidate “not
116
later than the 48th day preceding the date of the general election.”
The statute, however, did not mention what procedure should apply
when a vacancy occurred within the last fifty days before the general
117
election.

available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=425 (discussing a poll
that showed Torricelli ahead 44% to 36%, but noting that Torricelli was vulnerable
particularly because many voters held an unfavorable view of him); see also
Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 108, at 316 (“Challenger political experience is
an important predictor of the vote in House and Senate elections.”).
111. See Torricelli Apologizes for Ethics ‘Lapses’, CNN.COM, July 31, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/30/torrecelli.ethics/index.html
(noting that Torricelli bought a CD player and television at below market-value
prices and borrowed bronze statutes to display in his office from a supporter, thereby
violating Senate rules).
112. PUB. MIND POLL, FARLEIGH DICKINSON UNIV., SEPT. 25, 2002 SURVEY (2002),
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/torch/tab.html (showing 47% of voters would vote or
were leaning towards voting for Forrester as compared to 43% for Torricelli when
asked “If the election for New Jersey’s U.S. Senator were held right now, and you had
to make a choice, which of the following two candidates would you vote for?”).
113. See Loughlin, supra note 4 (stating that Torricelli’s campaign “called reports
of his possible withdrawal ‘misleading rumors’” early in the day, but that after
Torricelli met with party leaders, he decided to withdraw from his race for reelection).
114. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1032 (N.J. 2002) (“On
September 30, 2002, Senator Robert G. Torricelli announced his withdrawal as the
New Jersey Democratic Party’s candidate for the United States Senate in the Nov. 5,
2002 general election.”).
115. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-20 (West 1999) (establishing only the procedure
for withdrawals that occur on or before the 51st day prior to the general election).
116. Id. § 19:13-20(d).
117. See id. § 19:13-20 (omitting any discussion of what should occur outside of the
time frame discussed in the statute); N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 814 A.2d at 1037 (“By
its terms, [the statute] establishes an absolute right in a State committee to replace a
candidate up to and including the forty-eighth day before the general election.
Here, we confront a vacancy created outside of the statutory window. Nothing in
[the statute] addresses the precise question whether a vacancy that occurs between
the forty-eighth day and the general election can, in that circumstance, be filled.”).
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While a strict reading of the statute could have kept Torricelli’s
118
name on the ballot, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the
119
The court declared that the statute’s silence
statute liberally.
regarding replacement during the last forty-seven days before the
120
general election did not forbid withdrawals or replacements.
Moreover, the court stated that the legislature did not intend “to
limit voters’ choice in a case where there is sufficient time to place a
new candidate on the ballot and conduct the election in an orderly
121
manner.” The court reasoned that even if a withdrawal took place
in the last fifty days before the general election, the candidate could
be replaced during the final forty-seven days before election day if it
was administratively feasible because the voters of New Jersey benefit
by having a candidate on the ballot from both of the major political
122
parties. This decision paved the way for the New Jersey Democratic
Party to replace Torricelli with former U.S. Senator Frank
123
Lautenberg.
118. If the statute meant to allow replacement during the last forty-seven days
before the general election then there is a strong argument that the legislature
would have included this information, but since the legislature is silent on this time
period, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not intend for any
replacements to occur during the last forty-seven days before the general election.
See Colby W. Smith, Note, Election Law—Analysis and Implications of Judicial
Interpretation of Ballot Access Statutes Pertaining to Candidate Substitution in the Era of
Modern Political Campaigning, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 825, 825 (2004) (declaring outright and
abruptly that the state statute at issue in the Torricelli case forbade candidate
withdrawal “within fifty-one days of the election” and thus forbade the withdrawal
and replacement of Torricelli). But see Angelo J. Genova & Jennifer Mazawey, In the
Election of 2002, the Voters of New Jersey Were the Winners, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 77, 85
(2002) (agreeing with the court’s decision that the statute does not include language
prohibiting a party from filling a vacancy within forty-eight days of the election).
119. See N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 814 A.2d at 1036 (noting the Court’s
traditionally liberal interpretation of the candidate replacement law “in the sense of
construing it to allow the greatest scope for public participation in the electoral
process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties to put their
candidates on the ballot, and most importantly to allow the voters a choice on
Election Day”).
120. See id. at 1038 (reasoning that, unlike other states’ statutes, which provide for
the consequences of a vacancy outside of the statutory window, the New Jersey
statute’s complete silence cannot be considered the legislature’s intention to
prohibit filling the vacancy). But see William E. Baroni, Jr., Administrative Unfeasibility:
The Torricelli Replacement Case and the Creation of a New Election Law Standard, 27 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 53, 74-75 (2002) (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme Court by calling
the judges “election monitors” who are ignorant of election deadlines and
concluding that the decision will have a “long-term effect on the practice of election
law” by creating unclear election deadlines).
121. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 814 A.2d at 1039 (emphasis in original)
(demonstrating the New Jersey Supreme Court’s liberal statute interpretation
providing emphasis on voter choice and supporting the two-party system).
122. See id. at 1039, 1041 (finding that “there is sufficient time before the general
election to place a new candidate’s name on the ballot” and that the modern
electoral process requires the participation of the two major parties).
123. Dems Pick Lautenberg to Replace Torricelli, CNN.COM, Oct. 2, 2002, http://archiv
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Political Parties’ Associational Right to Choose a Standard Bearer Should
Extend to Allow Candidate Replacement
A discussion about the associational rights of political parties
should begin with the distinction between public and private
associations. As noted above, the White Primary Cases show that the
124
Court did not see political parties as purely private associations.
However, the string of cases from Tashjian to California Democratic
Party demonstrates that political parties are not completely public
125
either.
The Constitution gives states control of the “times, places
126
and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives.”
But, Justice Marshall wrote in Tashjian that “this authority does not
extinguish the State’s responsibility to observe the limits established
127
by the First Amendment rights of the State’s citizens.” In regulating
how political parties can replace withdrawn candidates, the states
128
must be cognizant of the freedom of association.
The political
party seems to be a hybrid public and private association that has
both associational rights and limits on the extent of those rights to
129
ensure voters are able to participate in the process. If a law imposes
es.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/01/elec02.nj.s.torricelli.race/index.html. The
article notes, interestingly, that Lautenberg and Torricelli were longtime rivals within
the New Jersey Democratic Party. Id. The seventy-eight year-old Lautenberg used his
name recognition and popularity in New Jersey to defeat Forrester by over 200,000
votes even though he only campaigned for the last month before the election. DIV.
OF ELECTIONS, N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, 2002 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 1-2
(2002), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/elections/2002results/02generalelection/2002g_
us_state_sum_candidate_tally.pdf.
124. See discussion supra Part I.A.1 (outlining the Supreme Court decisions that
led to the eventual end of the white primaries in the south by stopping political
parties from excluding people from voting in the primary election based solely on
race and guaranteeing the rights of the black voters under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution).
125. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (chronicling the Supreme Court cases from
1986 to the present that expanded associational rights of political parties to ensure
that they had both the power to include independent voters or exclude independent
voters from the party’s primary election).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
127. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).
128. See id. (“The power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections does
not justify, without more, the abridgment of fundamental rights, such as . . . the
freedom of political association.”).
129. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties:
A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1752 (1993) (discussing an interpretation
that “most of us want,” namely “that parties bear constitutional rights and that they
act unconstitutionally when they deprive any group of citizens of the opportunity for
political participation” (original emphasis)). The Supreme Court decisions during
the White Primary Cases and the more recent cases regarding party affiliation of
primary voters show that the Court agrees with this view of political parties having a
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a severe burden on these hybrid associational rights of the political
party, then the law is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to
130
serve a compelling state interest.
1. A political party’s associational rights are severely burdened when the party
cannot name a standard bearer
The first step in analyzing whether political parties’ First
Amendment freedom of association extends to candidate
replacement is to examine whether candidate replacement laws
131
severely burden the hybrid associational rights of political parties.
In general, the situation in question arises when “candidate X” wins
the primary election but subsequently attempts to withdraw his or her
candidacy before the general election takes place. After this
withdrawal, the result is essentially the same as the situation before
the primary election; the party has no general election candidate and
there are many people who want to run for the office by replacing
“candidate X” on the ballot. The major difference is that the primary
voters already picked “candidate X” to represent them and now
“candidate X” is no longer available.
In California Democratic Party, Justice Scalia began his analysis by
clarifying “that a State may require parties to use the primary format
132
for selecting their nominees.”
The high cost associated with
holding an election often makes the option of an additional primary
133
election impractical after the original nominee withdraws.
Most
state laws, therefore, allow party leaders to select a replacement for
“candidate X” in specific circumstances and within certain time
134
constraints.
These limitations have led to situations where there
mix of constitutional rights and constitutional requirements.
Compare Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (concluding that parties can
exclude voters not registered in their party from the primary election), with Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 477 (1953) (concluding that groups of party members could
not hold straw polls that exclude voters based on the race of the voter, when the
straw poll led to an inevitable primary election and general election victory for the
winner).
130. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 586 (striking down a state
proposition under strict scrutiny for burdening a political party’s associational
freedom).
131. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214 (articulating that a court must inquire first into
the character and magnitude of the statute’s imposition on the party’s rights).
132. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 572.
133. Cf. Election Cost—$4 Billion and Climbing, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 2, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6388580 (“The National Association of Secretaries
of State estimates the elections will cost an average of $33 million per state.”).
134. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 100.111(4)(a) (2005)
In the event that death, resignation, withdrawal, removal, or any other cause
or event should cause a party to have a vacancy in nomination which leaves
no candidate for an office from such party, the Department of State shall
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may be sufficient time to replace “candidate X” on the ballot, but a
restrictive state law does not allow the political party to do so, such as
135
with Tom DeLay’s withdrawal in 2006.
The Supreme Court has indicated that a state law that effectively
does not allow a political party to replace a withdrawn candidate may
136
be a large burden on the party’s associational freedom.
In Eu,
Justice Marshall noted that “[f]reedom of association means . . . that
a political party has a right to . . . select a standard bearer who best
137
represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”
Similarly,
Justice Scalia wrote in California Democratic Party that “[t]here is simply
138
no substitute for a party’s selecting its own candidates.”
If a
candidate withdraws after winning the primary and the political party
is unable to name a replacement for the general election, then the
law effectively eliminates the party’s constitutional right to select a
139
standard bearer as guaranteed by the Supreme Court.
The Texas ineligible candidate statute is a good example of a
statute that puts extreme restrictions on the rights of a party to

notify the chair of the appropriate state, district, or county political party
executive committee of such party; and, within 5 days, the chair shall call a
meeting of his or her executive committee to consider designation of a
nominee to fill the vacancy. The name of any person so designated shall be
submitted to the Department of State within 7 days after notice to the chair
in order that the person designated may have his or her name on the ballot
of the ensuing general election. If the name of the new nominee is
submitted after the certification of results of the preceding primary election,
however, the ballots shall not be changed and the former party nominee’s
name will appear on the ballot. Any ballots cast for the former party
nominee will be counted for the person designated by the political party to
replace the former party nominee. If there is no opposition to the party
nominee, the person designated by the political party to replace the former
party nominee will be elected to office at the general election. For purposes
of this paragraph, the term ‘district political party executive committee’
means the members of the state executive committee of a political party
from those counties comprising the area involving a district office.
135. See discussion supra note 13 (detailing the strict requirements of the Texas
statute for candidate replacement even when DeLay withdrew many months before
the general election).
136. See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 574 (noting the importance of the
political party’s right to exclude people from the association during the nominee
selection process).
137. Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
138. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 581.
139. See id. at 581 (emphasizing that the most important aspect of a political party
is being able to choose its own candidates); Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 (reinforcing that
selecting a “standard bearer” for the party is at the heart of political association
because while voters have the right to identify with a party, the party also has a right
to “identify the people who constitute the association”).
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140

choose its candidate. Under the Texas statute, if “candidate X” dies
141
then the party may replace “candidate X” on the ballot. However, if
“candidate X” decides to move out of the country or state and does
not wish to seek election any longer, the federal courts interpreted
the statute as not allowing a replacement of “candidate X” since there
is a chance “candidate X” will return to the state before the
142
election.
The Texas statute, as interpreted by the federal courts, leads to the
result of forbidding political parties in Texas to replace candidates
143
who abandon the state and their election race.
This indefensible
result occurred in spite of the Supreme Court holding that selecting
a “standard bearer who best represents the party’s ideologies and
preferences” is within the political party’s First Amendment freedom
144
of association.
When the Texas law prohibits a replacement, the
political race that follows does not have a candidate from each of the
major political parties and therefore limits the choices of voters as
145
well as the desire of the party to have a candidate in the race. Just
140. See discussion supra Part I.B.1 (noting the relevant statute regarding Tom
DeLay’s withdrawal and showing that the Fifth Circuit's reading of the statute leaves
political parties with little leeway to replace a candidate who moves out of state).
141. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 145.003 (Vernon 2006) (stating that candidates
can only be declared ineligible if their applications for place on the ballot or other
public record conclusively establish ineligibility). Certainly a death certificate is a
public record that conclusively establishes ineligibility, but the other eligibility
standards are governed by the U.S. Constitution, according to the federal court. See
Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, No. A-06-CA-459-SS, 2006 WL 1851295, at *4
(W.D. Tex. July 6, 2006), aff’d, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting the
Constitution as listing three requirements that “are exclusive and may not be
changed or expanded in any way” for eligibility to be elected to the House of
Representatives: first, the candidates must be twenty-five years old; second, they must
have been a U.S. citizen for at least seven years; and third, “when elected” they must
be an inhabitant of the state for which they are elected to represent); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
142. See Tex. Democratic Party, 2006 WL 1851295, at *8 (“[N]o determination as to
DeLay’s eligibility due to present inhabitancy in Virginia can be made at this time or
at any time prior to election day because construing the Texas Election Code to
permit such a declaration of ineligibility based on inhabitancy at this time would be
an unconstitutional application of state law.”).
143. See id. (concluding that even though DeLay was living in Virginia, registered
to vote in Virginia, and had no intention whatsoever of continuing his bid for reelection, the U.S. Constitution would not allow a replacement because there was a
possibility that DeLay could move back to Texas on election day and therefore fulfill
all the constitutional requirements).
144. Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 (quoting Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 525
F.2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). The need for a party to select its standard bearer
after a candidate abandons interest in the election is similar to the need for a party
to endorse its preferred candidate before the primary election, which the Court
guaranteed in Eu. Id.
145. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 595 (5th Cir. 2006)
(leading to the situation where the Republican Party of Texas cannot replace their
nominee who has quit the race in a congressional district that generally votes
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as in Tashjian, state laws that do not allow a political party to replace
its candidates limit “the [p]arty’s associational opportunities at the
crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the
146
community.”
If a political party may not replace its withdrawn
candidate, it is effectively disallowed from naming a standard bearer
for the party contrary to rights seemingly protected by the Supreme
147
Court.
The Supreme Court’s recent line of cases establishing greater First
Amendment associational freedoms for political parties should
extend to include the right of a party to replace a candidate who
148
withdraws from a race. Even if the candidate dies or quits the race
the day before the election, the political party and all members of the
party have a burden on their associational rights if the party is not
149
permitted to replace the withdrawn candidate.
Without a new
candidate being selected, voters would lack meaningful choice
between the two major political parties. A political party and its
members should not lose the right to select a standard bearer
whenever a candidate withdraws from the election after winning the
primary. As long as a replacement is logistically possible before the
election, the political party should be able to select its standard
bearer when the original primary winner is no longer running for
office.
State laws that do not allow political parties to replace a withdrawn
general election candidate place a severe burden on the associational
rights of the political parties because the party is denied the
opportunity to choose a standard bearer. After considering the
nature of the right, an examination of a state law that severely
burdens a party’s associational rights then shifts to address whether
150
the law “is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”
strongly Republican, thus giving the Democratic Party a much stronger chance of
winning).
146. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986).
147. Cf. Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 (securing a political party’s right to select a standard
bearer by ensuring parties are allowed to grant endorsements during the primary
election).
148. Cf. Pildes, supra note 65, at 106 (citing Antonin Scalia, The Legal Framework for
Reform, COMMONSENSE, vol. 4, no. 2, at 40, 49 (1981)) (quoting Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia on regulating primary elections of political parties: “As an
original matter, I happen to think [any such legislation] should be [invalidated]. I
see no reason why the government should be any more able to tell the Republican
Party how to choose its leaders than to tell the Mormon Church how to select its
elders.”).
149. Cf. Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 (noting that the selection of a standard bearer in the
general election race is one of the most important functions of a political party).
150. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000).
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This Comment will examine the Texas and New Jersey statutes, as
they are illustrative of the various candidate replacement laws in the
country.
2. The Texas candidate replacement law does not serve a compelling state
interest
The Texas candidate replacement statute can pass constitutional
151
muster if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The Texas statute allows for replacement of an ineligible candidate,
but the federal courts held that candidates may be declared ineligible
only if they do not satisfy the constitutional requirements of age,
152
citizenship, and inhabitance on Election Day. Since the argument
to replace DeLay was not made on freedom of association grounds,
what Texas would claim as a compelling state interest is unknown.
However, the most likely state interest for Texas to argue is that the
153
law promotes fairness in elections.
In fact, the Texas Democratic
Party argued that allowing the Republican Party of Texas to replace
Tom DeLay on the ballot would be unfair because it would require a
change of strategy and a need to raise more money and resources for
154
“an entirely different campaign.”
Fairness is certainly a concern in all elections, but there is no
155
evidence that changing candidates actually makes elections unfair.
151. See id. (requiring courts to strictly scrutinize the heavy burdens a statute
imposes on a party’s associational freedom).
152. Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 589-90 (5th Cir. 2006); Tex.
Democratic Party v. Benkiser, No. A-06-CA-459-SS, 2006 WL 1851295, at *5-*6 (W.D.
Tex. July 6, 2006), aff’d, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
153. Cf. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring) (noting that Florida advanced the “concededly important interest of
ensuring free and fair elections” as a reason for its law that the Court deemed to
infringe on the First Amendment freedom of the press rights of the petitioners).
154. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Complaint at 5, Tex. Democratic Party
v. Benkiser, No. A-06-CA-459-SS, 2006 WL 1851295 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2006), aff’d,
459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 2006).
155. Cf. Marc Caputo, Signs for Foley Replacement Can’t Be Posted Near Polls, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 19, 2006, at B6, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald
/news/15793109.htm (discussing fairness in replacement candidates and quoting a
Republican lawyer as arguing that Democrats think supplying notices of a candidate
replacement are fair when the candidate is a Democrat, but unfair when the
candidate is a Republican). The statement sets forth the foundation of a strong
argument that candidate replacement is neither fair nor unfair in an election, but
rather that the party who needs to replace at that particular time thinks it is fair and
the other party argues that the process is unfair. Cf. id. (“The case drips with irony:
Democrats, accustomed to arguing for full and open elections, want to limit election
information that even the judge said sounded fair. Republicans, who say voters are
smart enough to figure out elections and need to take ‘personal responsibility’ to stay
informed, now want the government to step in.”). When commentators discuss what
is necessary to ensure fair elections, the topic of candidate replacement is rarely, if
ever, discussed. For example, a search on Google.com on Jan. 17, 2007 for the
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Although former Senator Lautenberg was able to win in New Jersey
after replacing the embattled Torricelli, former Vice President Walter
Mondale, for example, was unable to win in Minnesota after
156
replacing the deceased Senator Paul Wellstone.
Both opponent
candidates had to shift their political strategy and adjust to the new
opponent, but political campaigns are constantly adjusting to new
revelations and news stories in a similar fashion, making a change in
157
strategy unlikely to be a major burden on candidates.
The state would likely claim additional compelling interests for the
candidate replacement law, such as avoiding voter confusion or
158
limiting additional cost of elections.
For example, the state may
argue that voter confusion would arise if the political parties were
159
allowed to pick a new candidate in the election whenever it pleased.
It is rare, however, that a situation arises where a party would like to
replace its candidate, because the original candidate already has the
support of most of the party voters, and therefore a change will often
160
hurt the party’s chance of victory.
Rather, candidate replacement
phrase “fair elections” returned about 1,070,000 results, and a search for the phrase
“candidate replacement” returned about 13,900 results. However, a search for pages
that include both the phrases “fair elections” and “candidate replacement” found
only two websites. Furthermore, each of these websites was a web log (“blog”) and
neither site actually discussed fair elections and candidate replacement together.
ELECTIONLAWBLOG.COM, ELECTION LAW ARCHIVES, http://electionlawblog.org/archiv
es.html (last visited May 31, 2007); DEMOCRATICUNDERGROUND.COM, ELECTION
REFORM, FRAUD, & RELATED NEWS, http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss
/duboard. php?az=view_all&address=203x451786 (last visited May 31, 2007).
156. Compare DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 109, with MINN. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF
STATE, 2002 MINNESOTA GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (2003), http://electionresults.sos
.state.mn.us/20021105/ElecRslts.asp?M=S&Races=0103 (showing former Vice
President Mondale received 47.34% of the vote, while Norm Coleman garnered
49.53% for the victory and 0.5% of voters still voted for the deceased Paul
Wellstone).
157. See generally John Theilmann & Allen Wilhite, Campaign Tactics and the Decision
to Attack, 60 J. POL. 1050 (1998), available at http://www.jstor.org/view/00223816/di
014746/01p0130f/0 (discussing the decisions and adjustments that must be made in
political campaigns around the use of negative advertisements).
158. Cf. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997)
(mentioning Minnesota’s argument that it has an interest in avoiding voter
confusion to support its reasoning for banning fusion candidates across multiple
parties); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147 (1972) (noting the “legitimate state
objective” of lowering the cost to the State of holding primary elections); Sonneman
v. State, 969 P.2d 632, 639-40 (Alaska 1998) (examining the State’s claimed interests
in “reducing costs in printing the ballots” and “preventing voter confusion”).
159. Cf. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364 (noting that Minnesota claimed that allowing a
candidate to serve as the nominee for more than one party could confuse voters).
160. Cf. Illinois GOP Offers Senate Nod to Alan Keyes, CNN.COM, Aug. 6, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/04/illinois.senate/ (discussing the
Illinois GOP’s six-week search for a candidate to replace primary winner Jack Ryan in
the 2004 Senate election and showing the difficulty of finding someone who wants to
replace a candidate without having a solid political base from a primary victory).
The Illinois Republican Party eventually settled on Alan Keyes as the replacement, a
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will likely only happen when it is absolutely necessary, as with the
death of a candidate, or when a candidate faces corruption and ethics
161
Furthermore, any voter
charges like Torricelli and DeLay.
confusion that arises will likely be to the detriment of the party who
chooses to replace its candidate and the party will have the burden of
162
informing the public of the change.
As for limiting the cost of elections and administering elections
effectively, the cost of replacing a candidate will be miniscule to the
163
state, unless the ballots have already been printed. If the state must
re-print ballots then the state would likely argue that limiting this
164
additional cost would further a compelling interest.
However,
Justice Marshall wrote in Tashjian that “the possibility of future
increases in the cost of administering the election system is not a
sufficient basis here for infringing [the party’s] First Amendment
conservative TV talk show host who was not a resident of Illinois. Id. Although there
is no telling how Jack Ryan would have performed as the Republican nominee, it
would have been difficult for him to do much worse than Alan Keyes. Cf. Illinois
Election Results 2004, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/elections/2004/il/ (listing U.S. Senate election results that show Democrat
Barack Obama defeated Republican replacement Alan Keyes with 70% of the vote to
Keyes’ 27%). But see Rick Hampson, Torricelli Fill-in Out of Retirement, USA TODAY,
Nov. 7, 2002, at 5A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/20
02-11-06-lautenberg_x.htm (reporting Democrat replacement Frank Lautenberg’s
victory over Republican Doug Forrester and thus showing that some replacement
candidates can overcome the difficulty of joining a campaign late).
161. See, e.g., Loughlin, supra note 4 (detailing Torricelli’s reasons for withdrawal).
Candidates all work hard to get their nomination and few, if any, want to withdraw
even in the face of serious allegations. Id. (noting that dropping out of the New
Jersey senatorial race was the most painful thing Torricelli has ever done).
162. Cf. Susan Roesgen, GOP Slogan: ‘Punch Foley for Negron’, CNN.COM, Nov. 7,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/POLITICS/blogs/politicalticker/2006/11/gop-sloganp
unch-foley -for-negron.html (showing some of the difficult hurdles that replacement
candidates must face by reporting a slogan used by replacement candidate Joe
Negron in an effort to inform voters that a vote for the disgraced and withdrawn
Mark Foley would actually be a vote for Negron). A party that must withdraw its
initial candidate and place a new person on the ballot risks confusing voters while
those who stick with the same candidate do not. See Sonneman, 969 P.2d at 639-40
(finding that voter confusion is a legitimate state interest and therefore important to
avoid). This is the chance that a party must take and attempt to overcome if they
decide to replace a candidate, which is another reason why such replacements rarely
occur.
163. If the ballots have not been printed, then the only cost associated with
changing a name is the time it takes to re-organize the ballot in the actual electronic
document used to set up the printing. If, however, ballots must be reprinted then
the cost can be very high, but that additional cost could be passed along to the party
making the replacement. See, e.g., N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d
1028, 1033 (N.J. 2002) (noting that the Democratic Party would have to pay $800,000
for reprinting of the absentee ballots).
164. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147 (1972) (noting the “legitimate state
objective” of lowering the cost to the State of holding primary elections). But cf. N.J.
Democratic Party, Inc., 814 A.2d at 1039-42 (concluding that the cost and feasibility of
reprinting ballots with thirty-four days before the general election is not enough of a
reason to stop the replacement from occurring).
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165

rights.”
Thus, arguing that the statute serves the compelling state
interest of limiting additional costs may be difficult and, even if
successful, there is a strong argument that the statute is not narrowly
166
tailored to serve that interest.
Remarkably, some state interests argued in prior litigation would
be furthered by the parties’ ability to replace withdrawn candidates
and not by a state law restricting replacement. For example, in
California Democratic Party, the state argued that its primary law would
167
give voters greater choice and increase voter participation. When a
candidate withdraws, however, voter choice is decreased and the
replacement of a withdrawn candidate who is no longer campaigning
gives voters an additional choice and may even get more voters to the
168
polls on election day.
Furthermore, in Tashjian, the state claimed
that they had a “compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the
169
If candidate replacement is not allowed, then
two-party system.”
only one of the major parties will have a candidate who wants to be
170
on the general election ballot.
However, if the replacement is
allowed then the two-party system is furthered by giving all voters two
171
viable options from which to choose. Since there would likely not
be a compelling state interest found and some compelling state
interests are furthered by allowing replacement, the statute would not
be “narrowly tailored” to serve any compelling state interests.

165. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 218 (1986).
166. Cf. id. (rejecting the claimed state interest of cost reduction). For a statute to
be narrowly tailored to reduce cost, it may need to have language regarding the date
on which the ballots are printed in order to help lower the cost rather than broad
language that does not allow for the replacement of candidates. Cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-343 (2006) (allowing replacement of candidates when they withdraw as
long as the required paperwork is filed before the official ballots are printed). The
Texas statute does not have this language narrowing the date when the statute is
effective. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 145.003 (Vernon 2006).
167. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000).
168. See N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 814 A.2d at 1034-35 (N.J. 2002) (“It is in the
public interest and the general intent of the election laws to preserve the two-party
system and to submit to the electorate a ballot bearing the names of candidates of
both major political parties as well as of all other qualifying parties and groups.”
(quoting Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 91 A.2d 865 (N.J. 1952))) (emphasis omitted).
169. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 222; see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520
U.S. 351, 364-67 (naming possible state interests for not allowing candidates to
become the party nominee for more than one party and including one state interest
as “favor[ing] the traditional two party system”).
170. See N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 814 A.2d at 1036 (stating that the law exists to
allow every party representation on a ballot).
171. See, e.g., id. at 1034-35 (supporting the two-party system and the general idea
that the voters are the winners when both the Republican and Democratic Parties
have a serious and competitive nominee on the general election ballot).
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3. The New Jersey candidate replacement law is narrower but still lacks a
compelling state interest
Although there are likely no additional state interests that New
Jersey, or any other state, could argue to support a law that does not
allow candidate replacement, it is worth looking briefly at how
narrowly tailored the New Jersey statute is to serving any conceivable
state interest. A statute that allows for candidate replacement up
until a certain amount of days before the election is unmistakably
more narrowly tailored than a statute that does not allow
172
The New Jersey statute allows replacement for
replacement at all.
any reason as long as it is sufficiently before the election to allow the
173
state to hold fair and competent elections. By setting a time where
replacements can occur, the state is arguably narrowly tailoring the
statute to allow replacements unless doing so would become too
174
costly or administratively infeasible.
This type of law, therefore,
may pass constitutional scrutiny if the state can successfully argue that
175
the statute serves a compelling state interest. Interestingly, the New
Jersey Supreme Court did not find the additional cost of replacing a
candidate after the statute’s deadline to be a good enough reason to
176
disallow the replacement.
Regardless of the additional cost analysis, the expenses associated
with changing a candidate in an election are dwindling as touch
screen voting technology limits the need for printing ballots
177
altogether.
If voting is all electronic then, just like updating a
172. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-20 (West 1999) (setting out procedure for
replacing candidates when withdrawal occurs anytime on or before the fifty-first day
before the general election).
173. Id.; see N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 814 A.2d at 1042 (concluding that the
candidate replacement was legal because it “will not affect adversely the right of any
qualified voter to participate in the election” and the replacement should go forward
because it is administratively feasible).
174. Where the state’s argued interest is administering fair elections, a statute that
allows candidate replacement up until it is administratively infeasible is much more
narrow than a statute that does not allow replacement at all. This type of reliance on
promoting fairness in elections seems to be New Jersey’s best defense of its candidate
replacement law. Cf. Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 1986)
(emphasizing in dicta the importance of the “state’s interest in insuring honest and
fair elections” and that this interest would allow for the conduct at issue even if due
process and equal protection rights were infringed).
175. Cf. id. at 1318 (showing that the state interest in ensuring fair elections is
adequate justification for some constitutional infringement).
176. Cf. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc., 814 A.2d at 1039-41 (allowing the replacement
of Torricelli even though some absentee ballots had already been mailed and
although re-printing and re-mailing new ballots would cost additional funds).
177. Many states now have some electronic voting and statutes that govern
electronic voting. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-7-20 (2007) (setting out definitions for the
“Electronic Vote Counting Systems” article of the “Electronic Voting Machines”
chapter of the Code of Alabama); Tom Zeller Jr., Ready or Not (and Maybe Not),
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computer document or web page, it will be very easy to change a
178
Therefore,
candidate if a party must make a replacement.
replacements may occur nearer to Election Day if they are necessary
and the administrative costs associated with such replacements will
179
continue to decrease as technology advances.
Reevaluation of the
laws surrounding candidate replacement is needed to devise a new
standard that preserves associational rights of political parties while
allowing the state to retain a system that is easy to administer, and
promotes voter choice and fair elections.
B. Recommendation of a National Legislative Standard for Candidate
Replacement in Races for Federal Office
Political parties should have the same constitutional right to
associate in every state, but candidate replacement laws of the various
180
states infringe on party associational rights differently.
A national
law that establishes a clear standard for candidate replacement would
provide stability to political parties and resolve candidate
replacement issues outside the court system. Although the Elections
Clause in Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives states the power to
regulate the time, place, and manner of holding elections, it goes on
to note that “the Congress may at any time by [l]aw make or alter
Electronic Voting Goes National, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, at 1, (discussing expansion
of electronic voting machines across the country). This expansion of electronic
voting is likely to continue, but there are many citizen groups and individual
politicians that are fighting to bring back paper ballots, due in part to a fear of
election fraud with the use of electronic ballots. See, e.g., Christian Davenport & Ann
E. Marimow, Ehrlich Wants Paper Ballots for Nov. Vote, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2006, at
A01 (explaining Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich’s desire to use paper ballots
after the electronic voting in the “primary election was plagued by human error and
technical glitches”).
178. But see David Cho & Lisa Rein, Fairfax to Probe Voting Machines; Election Board
Report Minimized Flaws, Supervisors Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2003, at B08 (describing
criticism from both Democrats and Republicans about the performance of the
county’s new $3.5 million electronic touch-screen voting machines). See generally R.
MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, POINT, CLICK, & VOTE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNET
VOTING (2004) (outlining the history of voting on the internet and the future
possibilities of internet voting in America).
179. But cf. Zeller, supra note 177 (stating that there are still many glitches in
electronic voting that need to be fixed before the general public will trust the
system).
180. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.165 (2006) (declaring that there are no
changes to be made to the general election ballot after one week past the primary
election, even in the case of the death of a candidate), and NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.175
(2006) (setting the twelfth Tuesday before the general election as the date of the
primary, and thus not allowing any candidate replacements during the last eleven
weeks (or seventy-seven days) before the general election), with ALA. CODE § 17-13-23
(2007) (allowing replacement of candidates for “death, resignation, revocation, or
otherwise” without setting a deadline for such replacement, thus permitting
withdrawal and replacement at any time and for nearly any reason).
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181

such [r]egulations.” Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted “it is
well settled that the Elections Clause grants Congress the power to
override state regulations by establishing uniform rules for federal
182
elections, binding on the [s]tates.”
The statute proposed in this
183
Comment would “make or alter” the current state laws on candidate
replacement as they apply to federal office, much like the
congressionally established campaign finance legislation that
regulates contributions to federal political candidates equally in every
184
state.
185
This Comment proposes the following federal statute:
(a) If a party nominee selected through a party primary election or
other selection process dies, becomes disqualified, or withdraws
his/her candidacy for any reason, then the vacancy shall be filled in
a special primary election to be conducted as provided in this
statute. All special primary expenses shall be paid by the political
party whose nominee must be replaced, except in the case of death
of a nominee or disqualification by law, where the state shall pay. If
more than one party requires a special primary, then the expenses
shall be paid by the parties proportionately to the number of
respective vacancies to be filled. The state shall pay for the special
primary if it falls on the day of the general election and the parties
shall pay for the special general election that follows. For a death,
disqualification, or withdrawal within the last four weeks before the
general election, the parties shall pay for the special primary
election and the state shall fund the special general election.
(b) The filing period for a special primary election to fill a vacancy
shall open the second Tuesday after the nominee’s death,
disqualification, or withdrawal, and shall remain open through the
following Tuesday.
The special primary election shall be
conducted on the second Tuesday immediately following the close
of the filing period, unless such special primary election would fall
within the four weeks preceding the general election date. If the
special primary is held four weeks or more before the date of the
general election, that office is to be filled at the general election. If
the special primary election schedule described would place the
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
182. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
184. See, e.g., Senate Approves Campaign Finance Bill, CNN.COM, Mar. 21, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/03/20/campaign.finance/index.ht
ml (discussing the passage of a campaign finance bill that will regulate campaign
contributions by individuals and organizations across the country when donating to
candidates running for federal office).
185. This proposed statute is modeled after a South Carolina statute. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 7-11-50 (2006).
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special primary within the four weeks preceding the general
election date, then the special primary election shall take place on
the day of the general election and the office shall be filled in a
special general election to be held on the second Tuesday in the
month following the special primary election.
(c) Where the party nominee whose position becomes vacant was
unopposed, each political party registered with the State Election
Commission may nominate a candidate for the office at issue
through a special primary election in the same manner and under
the same procedures provided by this statute.
(d) If no deaths, disqualifications, or withdrawals have occurred, or
if all parties have elected replacements by the Tuesday four weeks
preceding the general election, then all necessary ballots, including
absentee ballots, shall be printed. If a vacancy for a particular
office exists for which a replacement has not been made by the
Tuesday four weeks preceding the general election, then all
necessary ballots, including absentee ballots, shall be printed once
all special election filing deadlines pass. If death, disqualification,
or withdrawal occurs within the last four weeks preceding the
general election then a notification shall be placed on the ballot
stating the date in which the special election will be held for the
office(s) with a candidate vacancy and the process provided in this
statute shall be followed.

Section (a) of the proposed statute addresses under what
circumstances a primary winner may withdraw from the general
186
election. Some state laws require the candidate to be extremely ill,
which raises subjective questions that are often difficult to answer
187
Other state laws have a list of
about the severity of the illness.
reasons detailing when withdrawal is allowed, many of which include
188
personal or family reasons.
Such broad statutes effectively allow
withdrawal for any reason and risk raising subjective questions about
the sufficiency of a reason to withdraw, which are difficult to decide
189
consistently. The proposed statute would eliminate the need to fit
186. Cf. id. (defining several examples of when a candidate may withdraw from an
election including limits to non-political reasons).
187. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-317 (2006) (setting “[r]easons of health,
which shall include any health condition which, in the written opinion of a medical
doctor, would be harmful to the health of the candidate if he continued” as a
“legitimate nonpolitical reason” for withdrawal from an election).
188. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-50 (2006) (listing “family crises” as a reason
that a candidate may withdraw and be replaced after gaining the party nomination);
W. VA. CODE § 3-5-19 (2007) (setting a window allowing replacement between the
primary and ninety-eight days before the general election for candidates with
“extenuating personal circumstances”).
189. Cf. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-117 (LexisNexis 2007) (requiring a “statement
from a licensed physician indicating that such ill health may endanger the
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the reason for withdrawal into a particular category by allowing a
political candidate to withdraw from the election for any reason.
This standard would reduce the amount of rule-bending necessary to
withdraw, and remove the subjective questioning that currently arises.
To deter political maneuvering, section (a) of the statute would
require the party to pay for and hold a new primary to select the
190
replacement when a candidate withdraws.
This procedure should
assure trustworthiness in the system and encourage the parties to
191
rarely use the statute. Furthermore, desire to win the election will
provide additional independent encouragement for political parties
to sparingly replace candidates because changing candidates during a
192
political campaign may not necessarily be a successful maneuver.
Under this proposed statute, withdrawals may take place at any
time, and the special primary must conclude before the fourth
Tuesday (or twenty-eight days) prior to the general election for the
193
race to be decided on the day of the general election. Each state,
candidate’s life” and thus indicating that the legislature worried candidates would
falsely claim they had a severe illness in order to withdraw from the election); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 7-11-50 (2006) (allowing withdrawal for “family crises” that can include
any “circumstances which would substantially alter the duties and responsibilities of
the candidate to the family or to a family business” and therefore essentially allows
the candidate to determine when to withdraw and let the party pick a replacement).
190. Cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-104 (2007) (setting forth a process to follow after a
candidate withdraws that will set up a special primary in order to select a new
nominee from the party); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-55 (2006) (declaring that a vacancy
after the original candidate was chosen through a primary election “must be filled in
a special primary election to be conducted as provided in this section”).
191. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (arguing that withdrawals will
occur in rare instances because candidates all work hard to get nominations and
have little desire to withdraw).
192. Cf. Coleman Wins Minnesota Senate Race, supra note 8 (noting that the
Democrats chose former Vice President Walter Mondale to replace the deceased
Paul Wellstone on the ballot for U.S. Senate). But see Dems Pick Lautenberg to Replace
Torricelli, supra note 123 (detailing the Democrats’ pick of former Senator Frank
Lautenberg to replace Torricelli in 2002 after Lautenberg retired from the Senate in
2000).
193. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-539 (2007) (allowing for replacement of withdrawn
candidate as long as such replacement is administratively feasible). The goal of the
proposed statute in this Comment is to set a firm line across states that both allows
the state to administer a fair election and protects the parties’ First Amendment
associational rights. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (setting out the
proposed statute). The state statutes vary as to when they allow a replacement, from
around 130 days before the election through Election Day itself. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 3-13-1-7 (LexisNexis 2007) (requiring that withdrawals and replacements
occur before June 30th, which is between 125 and 131 days before the general
election on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of Nov.); WIS. STAT. § 7.38 (2006)
(allowing replacement of the name of the deceased candidates to occur up until the
day of the election and providing statutory language to permit stickers with the new
candidate’s name to be placed over the deceased candidate on the ballot). The
average number of days before Election Day that the statutes allowed candidate
replacement to occur was roughly thirty-six days prior to the general election. The
proposed statute is modeled after Section 7-11-50 of the Code of Laws of South
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further, may not mail out absentee ballots until twenty-eight days
194
before the election assuring that the absentee ballots are final. If a
candidate withdraws between one and twenty-eight days before the
general election, this proposed statute draws a bright line and the
195
candidate will not be replaced on the ballot.
Instead, the special
election process would continue as described in the proposed statute
and a special general election to fill the office would occur on the
second Tuesday of the month following the original general
196
election. The statute also defines specific timelines for the special
election process, including section (c), which allows other political
parties to nominate candidates after a withdrawal in order to stop
unopposed candidates from ensuring their political party holds the
197
seat.
This statutory scheme strikes a balance between political parties’
First Amendment freedom of association rights, voters’ rights to
electoral choice, and the state’s interest in conducting a fair election

Carolina Annotated, which allows the general election ballot to be set up until
fourteen days before Election Day. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-55 (2006). The
proposed statute in this Comment uses twenty-eight days to provide the state the final
ballot in enough time before the election to administer the election. The state can
print ballots a full four weeks before the general election, thus providing a
reasonable amount of time to fulfill administrative responsibilities. Furthermore, the
political party is protected fully because replacements are still allowed and a special
election is held for withdrawals that occur within the last four weeks before Election
Day.
194. This would ensure that the state does not lose money from the cost of
reprinting ballots. Another potential way to limit the state’s losses is to make the
political party pay for any reprinting costs. See N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson,
814 A.2d 1028, 1033 (N.J. 2002) (requiring the New Jersey Democratic Party to pay
$800,000 to cover the cost of reprinting the ballots after the court ordered the
replacement of the candidate).
195. Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-501 (2007) (allowing replacement of candidates
who die, resign as a result of disability certified by a physician, or are disqualified
after the primary election and up until the deadline for voters to register to vote,
while disallowing any replacements after the deadline for voters to register for the
election); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-102.5 (2007) (setting the voter registration
deadline at “30 calendar days before the date of the election” and if that day is a
weekend or holiday then extending the deadline “to the next regular business day”).
196. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-50 (2006) (“If the nomination is certified less than
two weeks before the date of the general election, that office must not be filled at the
general election but must be filled in a special election to be held on the second
Tuesday in the month following the election . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 49.58 (2006)
(proscribing a special election “on the first Tuesday after the second Monday in
December” rather than attempting to make a change to the ballot after the death of
a candidate and instead of counting any votes on the original election day).
197. Cf. Margaret R. Kugel, Note, Political Pinch-Hitting: Fair or Foul Play in the 2002
New Jersey Senate Election?, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1178 n. 194 (2003) (noting that
“[u]nopposed candidates are not a rarity in United States elections” in support of the
argument that candidate replacement should not occur as it did for Robert
Torricelli’s candidacy in 2002).
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198

with viable candidates.
The state will avoid exorbitant costs since
the party will pay for special elections when candidates choose to
withdraw and there will be no need to reprint ballots for the initial
199
general election. Additionally, candidates and parties will know the
exact rules of the game and these rules will be the same across every
200
Ultimately, this federal statute
state with respect to federal races.
would ensure that disparate results, such as those exemplified by the
201
Tom DeLay and Robert Torricelli cases, would no longer occur.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the White Primary Cases that political parties do not
202
have absolute First Amendment freedom of association privileges.
However, the more recent Supreme Court decisions show that one
area where political parties do have strong associational rights is in
deciding who may vote in their primary election based on non203
discriminatory standards like party registration.
This right of
association is, broadly stated, a guarantee that the political party can
choose its candidate in the best way it sees fit, as long as the party
does not discriminate against any racial group or other suspect
204
class.
In the event that a party’s primary winner dies, becomes
disqualified, or withdraws before the general election, the party is left
in the same situation as before the primary and their right to choose
a new candidate should not be lesser than their initial right to choose
205
the original candidate.
Currently, each state defines when parties
are allowed to replace withdrawn candidates, and many state laws
place severe burdens on the party’s right to choose a replacement
198. See discussion supra Part I.A (detailing the First Amendment freedom of
association protections for political parties and how state laws should be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest such as conducting fair elections and
creating a real choice for voters between the two major parties).
199. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147 (1972) (noting the “legitimate state
objective” of lowering the cost to the state of holding primary elections); Election
Cost—$4 Billion and Climbing, supra note 133 (discussing the enormous costs of
elections).
200. Cf. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000) (establishing
campaign finance laws for “general, special, primary, or runoff election[s]” to federal
office regardless of the state in which the election is held).
201. See discussion supra Part I.B (analyzing and discussing the attempted
replacements of Tom DeLay and Robert Torricelli in their respective states).
202. See discussion supra Part I.A.1 (concluding that exclusion of blacks in
primaries was illegal and violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
203. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (finding that political parties have some
associational rights based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
204. See discussion supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the notion that discrimination
based on race will always be illegal in political party decision-making).
205. See discussion supra Part II (detailing the problems a party faces when a
candidate withdraws before an election).
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206

standard bearer in federal elections.
Selecting a candidate to
appear on the general election ballot is one of the most critical
activities of a political party, and state laws should not be able to
infringe upon that process without being narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. The national standard proposed in this
Comment would preserve the associational rights of the political
parties consistently throughout the country, while still allowing the
states to hold successful and efficient elections.

206. See discussion supra Part II (showing through several examples how state
codes place heavy burdens upon parties that must replace a candidate and offering
analysis as to why these burdens should be lightened).

